We conducted two field experiments in a tree-thinning setting. In one experiment, we switched the pay of a randomly chosen half (the treatment group) from hourly wages to piece-rate pay. Workers in the control group were paid hourly wages throughout. In the second experiment, workers were switched from hourly to piece-rate pay all at once. The difference-in-difference and before-after estimates suggest that the productivity increase was on the order of 20-23 percent. Although the sample size is small, the estimates are statistically significant and robust. While the quality did not drop, the study highlights the measurement costs in setting up the right level of piece rates. We also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using randomized control (and treatment) groups or not in conducting field experiments within firms.
Introduction
Piece rate contracts are a form of compensation methods where the pay to the agent (the worker) is the number of pieces produced by the agent multiplied by a rate that is set by the principal. Compared with other compensation contracts such as salary or hourly wage which do not directly tie the agent's pay with their current-period performance, piece rate contracts provide the agent incentives to produce more pieces (Lazear, 1986) . Well understood main weaknesses of piece rate contracts include multitasking concern (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992) and ratchet effect (Gibbons, 1987; Kanemoto and MacLeod, 1992) .
There is an empirical literature on the incentive effect of piece rate contracts. Consistently estimating the incentive effect requires an identification strategy that achieves an exogenous change in incentive pay method.
1 One way to achieve the variation in pay scheme is through time-series change. Lazear (2000) exploits plant-worker-level data in an auto-glass installation firm that implemented a change from hourly wages to piece rate pay across plants during a 19-month period. The gradual introduction of the scheme allowed for controlling for other changes over time, such as possible management style changes and seasonal order fluctuations. One possible weakness of this approach is that the plants that were treated earlier might experience different changes over time than those that were treated later.
2 Possibly the cleanest way to generate an exogenous change in incentive plans, besides a natural field experiment, is through what Harrison and List (2004) called "framed field experiments." Shearer (2004) conducts an experiment where the pay method was switched from hourly wage to piece-rate pay at a tree-planting setting. He implements the randomization into treatment in a way such that the same worker get equal days of working under hourly wage and piece-rate pay. 3 The strength of this approach is that the sample is balanced. This paper looks at a different production setting and uses two 1 For example, using cross-sectional firm-level data requires the researcher to address the firms' choices of contracts; if there are unobserved firm characteristics that affect a firm's choice of contracts and the firm's productivity, the coefficient on the contract will be biased. The same problem arises when using cross-sectional variations in contracts within a firm. Recognizing this problem, Paarsch and Shearer (1999, 2000) model the firm's choice of contracts across fields and rely on a structural estimation method to consistently estimate the productivity effect of piece rate contracts in a tree-planting setting. The cost of a structural estimation, of course, is that one has to make a series of assumptions on the players' preferences and the production technology. 2 Lazear (2000) notes that the firm implemented the change geographically, rendering this concern less relevant. Another possible weakness is that since the policy was phased in during a period of time, it is likely that workers in an untreated plant anticipate the change in the pay method and might hold down their effort until under the piece rate pay period. In principal, the author could check whether this is a true concern by documenting whether plants that are to be treated show any reduction in their productivity prior to the treatment. 3 It is not entirely clear from the paper how exactly he executed the randomization. different designs of field experiments: In experiment 1, we randomly assigned workers to the control and the treatment group at the beginning of the experiment, that is, once a worker was assigned to the control or treatment (test) group, he or she will stay in that group. In experiment 2, we switched all workers at once from hourly wages to piece rate pay.
The field experiment was conducted in an orchard in central Washington State. The job under examination is tree-thinning where workers remove apples until only one is left per spur. The job is relatively simple, so the multi-tasking concern is minimal here. In the first experiment, workers were initially paid hourly wages with workers' income being hours worked times the hourly rate. We then switched the pay of a randomly chosen half (the treatment group) to piece rate pay where the pay is the number of thinned trees multiplied by the piece rate. Workers in the control group were paid hourly wages throughout. In the second experiment, we switched the pay method for all workers at once.
An examination of the 68 daily worker productivity observations suggests that the productivity increase was around 23 and 36 percent, respectively. Further analyses suggest that the true productivity effect is closer to 23 percent. The quality of the thinning did not decline. These results are robust to different estimation methods and to the inclusion of a series of control variables. There was no employee turnover during the experiment, so to examine the selection effect of piece rate contracts, a questionnaire was administered to workers. Responses suggest that a high-ability worker indeed prefers a piece rate to an hourly wage contract.
Besides providing additional evidence of the incentive effect of piece rate contracts, 4 this paper also highlights the importance of measurement costs in implementing piece rate pay and can help explain the absence of piece rate pay in certain jobs despite multi-tasking concern being minimal. In the thinning job where pay is based on the number of trees thinned, the condition of each field needs to be accurately estimated so that the right level of piece rate is set, a cost that need not be incurred if using hourly wages. 5 This paper adds to a growing literature on using field experiments to examine productivity effects of various pay methods. Of particular relevance is Bandiera et al. (2005) where they switch a pay method that is based on workers' relative performance evaluation to pure piece-rate pay in a fruit-picking setting, and find a collusion effect under the relative performance evaluation but not in the piece-rate pay. 6 Their study has richer design and data, allowing them to conduct more structural analyses, including shedding light on the impact of ratchet effect and controlling for the Hawthorne effect of piece-rate pay. By experimenting with two different methods, this paper also aims to contribute to the discussion of the relative strengths of different field experimentation methods within firms.
A considerable weakness of this study is its small sample-size and short duration, which left many questions unanswered, such as the heterogeneous responses across workers, and whether the behavior change in response to the incentive change is a long run phenomena or not.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines a model to guide the empirical analysis, Section 3 describes the experiment, and Section 4 provides results on the incentive effects of piece rate contracts. We conclude in Section 5.
A Simple Model
The production technology for hand tree-thinning is modeled as
where N is the number of trees thinned, which is the output measure that the piece-rate contract rewards, e is effort which is unobservable by the principal, θ is the density of apples in the trees that a worker thinned, and  is production uncertainty, like weather or worker proficiency with thinning. The more apples a tree has, the more time it takes to thin the tree, and the fewer number of trees a worker can thin. We assume that the random variable θ follows distribution ,
, and the two are independent. Under hourly wages, a worker's hourly rate is fixed at the time that he joins the firm and his income depends on hours worked times his hourly rate.
See, e.g., also Nagan et al. (2002) which studies the effect of random monitoring on employees' opportunistic behavior in telemarketing, Bandiera et al. (2009) which investigates the effect of managers' incentive contracts on their favoritism towards workers in a fruit-picking setting, and Fehr and Goette (2007) which examines the impact of changes in commission rate on messengers' choice of working hours and effort level. 7 Two mechanisms are in place to ensure performance under hourly wage. One is input monitoring. The other is the potential for a worker's future hourly rate to be increased if his current performance is good. Workers' hourly rate varied from $7.63 to $8.48 for these twenty-four workers. To get a sense of the magnitude of the second mechanism, we regress workers' hourly rate on their productivity on hourly wage days. Hourly rates did not vary with workers' productivity at Ranch 2. At Ranch 1, the estimated coefficient suggests that a 10 percent increase in productivity from the mean value was associated with a 1.5 percent increase in hourly rate from the mean value, i.e., from $8.05 to $8.17 per hour. We can see that while pay was positively rate pay, a worker's wage contract takes the form of
where w is a worker's compensation and β is the piece rate.
8 For simplicity, we abstract from the risk-sharing issue; we assume that both the principal and the agent are risk neutral. The worker's expected utility is assumed to take the form  is a white noise error term. 10 Effort is unobservable to the principal and the econometrician, yet one can find an unbiased estimator of it using Nθ. 
Two Small Field Experiments

Experiment Design
The experiment was conducted in July 2006 at Yakima Valley Orchards (YVO) in central Washington State. Covering 800 acres of land, YVO grows apple, cherry, associated with productivity at this ranch, the magnitude of the incentive from revised hourly rate was very small. 8 A natural question arises regarding why the pay is not tied to the number of apples thinned. This alternative contract indeed better captures the agent's effort, but it requires a high measurement cost: counting the number of apples thinned. 9 Based on this incentive constraint and the participation constraint as well, it is clear that for a field with a higher θ, the piece rate should be higher. First, the return to effort (the number of trees thinned for a level of effort exerted) will be lower with a higher θ, so a greater piece rate is needed to induce the worker to exert the right amount of effort. Second, from the participation constraint, w=βN, in a field with higher θ, N will be lower, thus β needs to be higher for the worker to earn a competitive level of earning for a given level of effort. It is important to note that by paying w=βN the firm is effectively paying zero fixed pay. 10 The variation in θ across fields demands that different levels of piece rate are used for different fields. For our regression which uses data from a particular field, θ is given and the piece rate is set at a certain level. For picking, piece rate contracts based on bins of fruit were used and considered to work well, whereas for hand thinning the firm mainly used hourly wages. The owner was dissatisfied with workers' productivity in thinning and was interested in finding ways of improvement. The owner was also concerned about attracting and retaining workers who were being enticed to leave agriculture jobs that paid $8 per hour on average for better-paid jobs in butchering, truck-driving, and retailing. Piece rate contracts were recommended as a candidate to help improve productivity in thinning. With the consent of the owner, the field researcher ran the experiment on the site to measure the incentive effect of piece rate contracts for thinning.
YVO is composed of approximately 65 blocks (of vastly different sizes) divided into seven ranches with six managers supervising front-line workers.
12 To run an experiment on a particular block of a ranch, three conditions needed to be met. First, the block had work to be done. Second, the field should be reasonably homogeneous (to reduce the impact of within-field heterogeneity on our estimates). And third, the ranch manager agreed to participate. Managers were paid a salary plus 5% of the profits from their own ranch; they were also paid 2% of the firm's total profit (after the 5% has been taken out). They therefore had incentive to reduce labor costs (by switching to piece rates), but some of them did not want to experiment with it because it took more time for them to monitor. In the end, the field researcher found two blocks that satisfied the conditions. The field researcher, with the assistance from the management, measured and recorded the workers' quantity and quality of trees thinned. In both experiments, workers were paid after the block was finished.
The first experiment was conducted at Ranch 1 in a block of 23.49 acres of Granny Smith apple trees. There were 1000 trees per acre and the trees were planted in rows of approximately 180 trees per row. Fourteen workers working at Before the thinning of the block started, we randomly assigned seven of the fourteen workers to a control group and the other seven to a treatment group. A control group was used to capture any changes simultaneous to the change in pay scheme, such as weather, management style change, or degree of proficiency. On the first day, all of the fourteen workers worked under hourly wages, which were set when they joined YVO. The average was $8.05 per hour. On day 2, the seven workers in the control group kept working under hourly wages, while the seven workers in the treatment group were switched to piece rate pay at a level set by the field researcher under the guidance of the ranch manager who was on vacation during that time.
14 The experim rized in the top panel of Table 1A .
Measures were taken to minimize other changes before and after the switch in pay scheme. An obvious concern was that an hourly worker would have found out that his fellow worker was being paid differently and might experience emotional fallout or other behavioral changes, introducing noise in the estimation of the productivity effect of piece rates. The other concern was the spillover effect: even without knowing that their fellow workers were paid differently, slow (likely control group) workers would catch up with their fellow fast (likely treatment group) workers to avoid looking slow, or they might free-ride. The field researcher and the ranch manager thus decided to allocate the control group to one end of the block and the treatment group to the other end to minimize communication and the spill-over effect (so that workers from one group can neither communicate with nor see those in the other group). The block was finished by the fourteen workers in two days. At the end of the experiment, the manager administered a questionnaire to all fourteen workers. The highest temper :00 p.m. The experiment design apples on the ground before the and redo is work, the manager would remind the worker to improve his quality.
Setting the Level of Piece Rate
ature was 96 F on day 1 and 95 F on day 2. The second experiment was conducted at Ranch 2 in a block of 10 acres of Gala apple trees. In each acre of the block, there were around eight rows with between 90 and 110 trees per row. Ten workers who finished working at other blocks were included in the experiment. These workers have worked under piece rate pay before in this firm. This field is non-uniform: There were more apples to be thinned at one end of the block than at the other end. Dividing workers into two groups and putting them at the two ends would have led to very noisy measures of estimates. The manager decided to switch all workers from hourly wages to piece rate pay halfway through the experiment, effectively a before-after approach. Workers finished most of the block in four days. The highest temperature was 98 F on day 1, 94 F on day 2, 84 F on day 3, and 92 F on day 4. One cannot entirely rule out the possibility of an upward bias of the estimate due to the change in weather, yet one should also realize that workers started their work at 6:00 a.m. and ended at either 12:00 p.m. or 3 is summarized in the bottom panel of Table 1A .
To decrease the influence of variability, every other row of trees was flagged with tape. The workers were instructed to thin only rows of trees with flagged tape during the first two days. When workers began piece rate pay, they thinned the tree rows that were not flagged. An advantage of allocating workers this way is that before and after the switch, workers worked on adjacent and thus similar rows. Indeed, the average number of switch was 163.98 and afterwards was 157.22.
Managers controlled quality by reviewing the trees that were thinned. Quality was judged on a 1-5 scale: the score is 1 if 99 percent or more of spurs are thinned well, that is, reduced to one apple per spur, 2 for 95 percent or more, 3 for 90 percent or more, 4 for 85 percent or more, and 5 for less than 85 percent. When the workers performed well, the manager praised them. If the manager repeatedly found that the quality was poor he would ask the worker to go back to redo the tree; the worker would not be paid for the tree until it was properly thinned. If the quality was not poor enough for the manager to ask a worker to go back h
The owner believed that he should pay $10 an hour for the wage to be competitive. That is, is the expected level of effort exerted by a piece rate worker.
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In reality, the ranch manager sends a motivated worker to work on the field and get a draw of θ. It is important to notice that by sending a motivated worker, the worker's effort is indeed a good estimator of It is clear that the denser the trees are with apples (θ the lower the value of N , and the higher the value of β will be set. Since N is the productivity from a sample of the whole field and if the field is not uniform, error might be introduced in setting the level of β.
At Ranch 1, the ranch manager was on vacation during the test, so the field researcher did not have the measure of expected piece rate productivity. While absent, the ranch manager used historical data on productivity under hourly wage to estimated that a motivated worker of average ability could thin around 50 trees per hour, and recommended that the field researcher set the rate at (($10/per hour)/(50 trees/per hour))=$0.20 per tree. On the block of Ranch 2, again the target pay-rate per hour was $10. The manager for this ranch, who was previously a very fast worker, believed that he could thin 20 trees an hour on 16 that field and set th e rate at (($10/hour)/( trees/hou per tree. e piec 20
15 At first sight, the dependency of the rate on the condition of the field makes one wonder how comparable effort responses across different conditions are. Indeed, different fields command different levels of piece rate: e ŵ $    , but one also notes that workers choose
Section 2). That is, on the one hand, a difficult field makes the return to effort lower, but on the other hand, the piece rate, β, is set higher, creating stronger incentives. It is in this sense that effort responses to different levels of piece rate across studies can be compared with each other. Of course, if the rate deviates from   e ŵ $  , workers' responses across different conditions would become more idiosyncratic and harder to compare with each other. Across our two experiments, as discussed later in Section 4.3, we find that the rate at Ranch 1 was gravely over-set (while that at Ranch 2 was at a much more reasonable level.) 16 Since the ranch manager is known to be very fast, much faster than an average motivated worker, the field researcher was concerned that the piece rate was set too low. The manager insisted, claiming that it was better setting it too low and then adjusting it upward than setting it too high and meeting workers' resistance in case of needing to adjust it downward. One can see that, in using piece rates as the compensation method, the manager needs to adjust the field-level piece rates to the expected productivity of an average motivated worker, which requires an accurate assessment of workers' effort level and the working conditions of that specific field or site. Also note that although a rate is set for each distinct field, that rate applies to all workers enlisted to work on that field.
Measuring Effort and Productivity
The variable of interest is a person's daily effort, which is unobservable. The production technology in Section 2 suggests that an unbiased estimator of worker effort (e) is the number of trees thinned adjusted for the number of excess apples on the trees (  * N ). 17 During the process of thinning, a worker threw the excess apples onto the ground, so we measured the intensity of his work using the number of apples on the ground. Details on how trees are planted in the two ranches are in the Appendix A.
The summary statistics on the number of apples on the ground are in Table  1B . The rows thinned by the control group had a mean of 47.52 apples on the ground on day 1 and 44.90 on day 2. The rows thinned by the test group had 86 apples on the ground on day 1 (under hourly wages) and 51.86 apples on day 2 (under piece rate). After a worker finished a row, he or she would be assigned to the next undone row. We treat the average number of apples on the ground by the control group on day 1, 47.52, as the reference, i.e., 1.
The block at Ranch 2 was indeed quite non-uniform in the number of excess apples: The ending side of the ranch is much thinner compared with the starting side. The average number of apples on the ground on day 4 (for rows that were worked on at the end of day 4) was 84.54, lower than those on day 2 (163.98) and day 3 (157.22). We missed the data on number of apples on the ground for day 1. In Appendix B, we use linear interpolation to obtain that data.
18
The field researcher recorded the number of apples left on the ground at three points of a row that a worker finished. There was great variability in the number of apples on the ground across the three points of a row and across rows for a group, possibly for two reasons. First, trees, both within a row and across rows within a group might have been heterogeneous in the number of excess apples. Second, there might have been randomness in how workers threw apples on the ground within an area of 87.12 square feet for each point (see Appendix A for details on measuring the number of apples on the ground.)
Two methods can be used for the adjustment. Method 1 is to use the number of apples on the ground for each worker on a day to adjust for that worker's daily productivity. Method 2 is to use the average number of apples on the ground for each group (the control or test group) on a day to adjust for a group member's daily productivity. If the variability mainly came from trees across the rows, method 1 is preferable since it better captures the true productivity of an individual worker. If the variability mainly came from the randomness in throwing, method 2 is preferable since it can effectively reduce this randomness by way of the law of "large" numbers. Whenever possible, we present results using both methods. In most cases, results are robust.
Results on Incentive Effect of Piece Rates
Basic Results
The unit of observation is a person-day; Ranch 1 has 14 * 2 = 28 and Ranch 2 has 10* 4 = 40 observations. Figure 1A uses the group average number of apples on the ground as the adjustor and shows the fourteen workers' adjusted number of trees thinned per hour (workers 1 to 7 belong to the control group and workers 8 to 14 the treatment group) at Ranch 1. One curve depicts workers' productivity on day 1 and the other on day 2. First, the adjusted number of trees thinned per hour for the control and the test group before the switch (on day 1) were very close at a level of 84 trees (close to half a row) per hour, which confirms the random nature in selecting workers into the groups. Second, the adjusted number of trees thinned 18 In Appendix C, we examine the robustness of estimation results to different assumptions on day 1 number of apples on the ground.
per hour for the control group barely changed from day 1 to day 2, while the productivity for the treatment group increased significantly. The x-axis is the worker ID. Workers 1-7 are in the control group; workers 8-14 are in the treatment group. The top curve refers to the productivity on day 2, while the bottom curve refers to the productivity on day 1. The number of trees thinned is adjusted using the group average number of apples on the ground. Figure 1A is the substantial heterogeneity in workers' productivity when they were all paid hourly wages.
Also noteworthy in
19 Figure 1B plots the workerlevel number of trees thinned per hour at Ranch 2, adjusted for the thickness of apples in trees using the group average number of apples on the ground. The upper curve represents the average (over days 3 and 4) productivity after the switch, and the lower curve represents the average (over days 1 and 2) productivity before the switch. Productivity under piece rate pay appears significantly higher than that under hourly wages.
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Panel A of Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the adjusted number of trees thinned per hour at the block of Ranch 1. Columns 1-4 display results using the group average thickness of apples as the adjustor: On day 1, an average worker in the control and treatment group thinned a very similar number of trees per hour; On day 2, the hourly number of trees thinned for the control group increased by 13 percent, and that for the treatment group increased by 52 19 Indeed there was substantial heterogeneity in workers' level of hourly wages. 20 Figures using the individual row count of apples on the ground as an adjustor have the same pattern.
percent. 21 This resulted in a difference-in-difference estimate of the productivity effect of piece rate of 39 percent. Days 1&2 Days 3&4
The x-axis is the worker ID. The top curve refers to the productivity on days 3 & 4 (piece rate pay). The bottom curve refers to days 1 & 2 (hourly wage). The number of trees thinned is adjusted using the group average apple counts on the ground.
The last two columns show the results using the individual worker's row thickness of apples as the adjustor. The control group saw an increase in productivity of 11 percent and the treatment group 50 percent, thus a 39 percent increase for the difference-in-difference estimator. Panel B of Table 2 shows the experiment results at the block of Ranch 2. Using the group (individual worker) count of apples on the ground, the productivity increase was 24.53 (23.78) percent.
Since workers were randomly assigned to the control and the treatment group, simple statistics (a difference-in-differences in means) captures the information on the productivity effect of piece rate contracts. Still, given our small sample size, the treatment may correlate with workers' ability in unknown ways. Notes: In adjusting, we treat the average number of apples on the ground by control group on day 1, 47.52, as the reference, i.e., 1. The entry is the mean number of trees thinned per hour.
To tease out the effect of unobserved ability and other observable characteristics from that of the change in incentive scheme at Ranch 1, we conduct a regression analysis and estimate an equation with the following specification:
where is the number of trees thinned per hour by worker i at date t, adjusted for the thickness of apples, is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 when worker i is paid by piece rate at date t, it Y it I t  is the date fixed effect, i  is the worker fixed effect when applicable, is the vector of worker characteristics, and is the error term. We are interested in knowing how a change from hourly wages to piece rates affects productivity; the coefficient of interest is β. The change in productivity from day 1 to 2 may be attributed to weather changes or the change in workers' proficiency in working at this ranch; we therefore include it X it  t  to capture these factors. The coefficient in Equation (2) thus is a difference-indifference estimator. One reason for including i  is that it can help account for the heterogeneity in workers' productivity; including them should reduce the standard error of the estimates.
Panel A of Table 3A provides the regression results. Columns 1 to 4 adjust the number of trees thinned using group average number of apples on the ground, and columns 5 to 6 using individual row count. Columns 4 and 6 include worker fixed effects. Column 1 estimates Equation (2) without including the date 2 dummy. The coefficient suggests that the change in productivity due to the change in compensation scheme is 48 percent.
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Column 2 estimates Equation (2) with both the indicator variable and the date 2 dummy, yielding a difference-in-difference estimator of 36 percent. Through a questionnaire, we were able to collect information on workers' characteristics, such as age, marital status, number of children, and months having worked at Yakima Valley Orchards; column 3 provides results when these additional variables are incorporated. The productivity increase in this case is 40.50 percent, and the coefficients on the demographic variables (age, marital status, number of children) are insignificant. The coefficient on the experience variable is, however, significant at the value of 0.0016, meaning one more year of experience at YVO raises productivity by 0.0016*12 = 1.92 percent. When we include the worker fixed effects in column 4, the difference-in-difference estimator remains at 36 percent, confirming that the assignment of workers into a control and treatment group was indeed independent from the worker ability. Meanwhile, the standard errors drop, as expected. Columns 5 and 6 are identical to columns 2 and 3 except that the adjustor is individual row count of apples on the ground. The coefficient on the variable of interest is of slightly greater magnitude but the standard deviation is also greater. Overall, results in Panel A of Table 3A suggests that the change in productivity due to a change from hourly wages to piece rate pay is on the order of 36 percent.
At Ranch 2, all workers were switched to piece rates halfway through the experiment. The equation to estimate is
where is adjusted using the group average count of apples on the ground. Compared with Equation (2), Equation (3) has no fixed effect for dates after the pay switch since it coincides with the change in pay scheme. The coefficient of interest, β , is thus a before-after estimator. The Panel B of Table 3A provides regression results. Odd columns use ordinary least squares (OLS) while even ones include worker fixed effects. Column 1 is of the simplest specification, with the indicator variable being the only explanatory variable. OLS with and without it Y 22 The 48 percent figure is derived this way: ln(productivity after the switch) -ln(productivity before the switch) = ln(1 + growth rate) = 0.39 ⇒ growth rate = 48 percent. The same reasoning applies to other estimates. worker fixed effects yields very similar results, a 23.7 percent increase in productivity, and the standard error with worker fixed effects is slightly lower than without. The third column provides the estimated coefficient of interest for Ranch 2 when we include demographic variables -age, marital status, number of children -and work experience. Demographic variables have little explanatory power. Work experience is positively related to productivity, but with little statistical significance. The coefficient of interest is statistically significant and at a level very close to the baseline estimate of 23 percent. 1. The number of trees thinned is adjusted using the group average count of apples on the ground in columns 1-4 and using the individual row count of apples on the ground in columns 5-6. 2. Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 3. The control variables in column (3) include the worker's working experience (in months) at YVO, his/her age, a dummy variable for his/her marital status, and the number of his/her children. 4. The entry in the last row (the percent change in productivity attributed to the use of piece rate) is computed using the estimated coefficient on the indicator variable for use of piece rate.
Before one draws a conclusion from the results, a concern is that the effect might be due to changes in other factors, like changed condition of the field across rows, weather, and increased proficiency with the task. For the first concern, we measured it using the number of apples on the ground, thus it is taken care of. The ideal data for capturing the impact of weather is a randomized control group, which we do not have. We believe the impact of weather is limited for two reasons. First, workers started at 6 a.m. Second, on day 1 and day 4 when the highest temperatures were 98 F and 92 F, respectively, workers stopped at 12pm instead of the usual 3pm, which reduced the impact of the temperature. Third, we explore a series of different specifications to examine the possible impacts of changed proficiency over the days. There is suggestive evidence that it increased: The average productivity on day 2 was 12.19 and that on day 1 was 11.08.
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To capture this, we add a dummy variable for day 1 to Equation (3), effectively comparing the productivity of day 2 (when greater proficiency was reached) with that after the switch in pay method. Our identifying assumption is that the proficiency plateaued after two days' work of the same task. Row 2 of Table 3B shows the result. The coefficient of interest indeed decreases to 17.35 percent. However, trees worked on day 4 were much less dense with apples, and thus productivity was lower since workers spent more time moving the ladder instead of thinning. Thus we include dummy variables for both day 1 and day 4 to Equation (3), and row 3 shows the results. This specification provides the highest R² among all, and the coefficient of interest is very similar to the baseline results in row 1, although with slightly greater standard error. In Appendix C, we further conduct a variety of robustness checks and find that the estimated coefficient is close to the baseline result.
The overall message from these exercises is that incentives, measured by hourly trees thinned, increased by 23 percent after switching from hourly wage to piece rate pay, an increase that is smaller than that on Ranch 1, yet very close to the magnitude obtained in Lazear (2000) and Shearer (2004) .
Discussion of Results from Ranch 1 and Ranch 2
Results in Table 3A for the block on Ranch 1 might overestimate the effect of a real-life piece rate. The rate, $0.2 per tree, was set based on an expected piece rate productivity of 50 trees per hour. We will show in Section 4.3 that the piece-rate was gravely over-set due to an underestimation of both the workers' productivity and the easiness of the job in piece rate rows. Had the piece rate been set at a reasonable level, the productivity effect would have been lower. We will also discuss in Section 4.5 other possible upward and downward biases from randomized control (and treatment) group design. If one believes that the effect of an abnormally high level of piece rate is the dominant factor, it is safe to say that based on data from Ranch 1, a 36 percent increase in productivity is probably the upper limit of the effect of a piece rate contract.
The estimated incentive effect is greater for Ranch 1, where randomized control and treatment groups were used, than it is for Ranch 2. As discussed in Section 3.1, aside from the experimentation design, two other factors differed across the two experiments. The first is that the level of piece rate was much more gravely over-set at Ranch 1 than at Ranch 2, and the second is that the group of workers at Ranch 2 have worked with piece rates before in the firm whereas workers at Ranch 1 have not. The greater effect in Ranch 1, therefore, is also consistent with the existence of Hawthorne effect, which states that the effect of an intervention will diminish over time. Therefore we believe that the results at Ranch 2 are closer to the true effect than those at Ranch 1. 
Results on Quality
Quality is measured by whether fruit clusters are reduced to singles and whether apples that are damaged by early season insects or diseases are removed. A worker's quality score is 1 if 99 percent or more of spurs are thinned well and 2 if 95 percent or more are. At Ranch 1, the control group's average quality rating changed from 1 on day 1 to 1.14 on day 2, and the test group from 1.07 to 1.14. At Ranch 2, the average quality rating decreased from 1.28 to 1.45. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 provide regression results for Ranch 1, where the specifications are identical to Equation (2) except that the dependent variable is quality. In either OLS or worker fixed effect regression, quality did not decrease with the switch in pay method. Columns 3 and 4 provide regression results for Ranch 2. Although the direction of the quality change is negative, it is statistically insignificant. The results suggest that while the speed of thinning increased with the replacement of hourly wages by piece rates, in this experiment quality did not decline. One plausible explanation is that the management made it clear that the worker was not paid for a tree that was poorly done. The second is that the manager kept an active check on the quality by providing workers timely feedback. 
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Measurement Costs Involved in Setting the Right Level of Piece Rate
Section 4.1 established that workers' productivity increased with the switch from hourly wages to a piece rate pay. We can examine whether the piece rate was set at a fair level by examining whether both the employer and the workers were better off under that piece rate. The orchard's profit per tree can be written as
where p is the price per apple, θ is the number of apples per tree and w is the compensation to the worker per tree. The worker's utility per hour (ignoring risk aversion) can be written as w-C(e) where w is the income per hour and C(e) is the disutility of working e level of effort. The rate at Ranch 1 turned out to be too high for two reasons: first, it underestimated the workers' productivity; second, it underestimated the easiness of the task. Based on historical data, the ranch manager at Ranch 1 estimated the piece rate productivity to be 50 trees per hour and set the rate at $10/50=$0.2 per tree.
The average productivity of treatment group workers under hourly wage (on day 1) was 46.4 trees per hour and the average hourly wage was $8.05. Thinning 1 tree thus would cost (1/46.4)*8.05=$0.17 and the orchard's profit per tree is p*1-0.17. Whereas at the field where piece rate of $0.20 per tree was used, thinning 1 tree would cost 1*0.2=0.2. Further, that field has θ=0.6, so the orchard's profit per tree in that field is p*0.6-0.2. It is clear that the orchard's profit is lower for the field using the piece rate of $0.2 per tree. On the other hand, workers were reaping a huge payoff. It was found that the rows on day 2 for treatment group workers were 60 percent as thin as those on day 1; that is, for the treatment group workers, workers were able to thin 1/0.6=1.66 times faster on day 2 than they did on day 1. Further, productivity increased by 36 percent with the switch to piece rate pay, so an average worker thinned 46.4*1.36*1.66=104.75 trees per hour, resulting in an hourly earning of $0.20*104.75=$20.95 per hour, which is way above the $10 target that the owner thought competitive. The actual $0.20 was gravely over-set. We do not know the exact utility function of workers, but we know that on average they responded by working 36% harder facing the piece rate.
On Ranch 2, the average productivity under hourly wage was 11.01 trees per hour and average hourly wage was $8. The ranch manager estimated the piece rate productivity to be 20 trees per hour, which appeared at first sight exceedingly ambitious, and set the rate at $10/20=$0.5 per tree, possibly too low at first sight. It was found that the row on days 3 and 4 (treatment days) were 67.73 percent as thin as those on days 1 and 2; that is, for the piece rate rows, workers were able to thin 1/.6773=1.4764 times faster than they did under hourly wages. Further, productivity increased by 23 percent with the switch to piece rate pay (from Table  3A) , so an average worker thinned 11.01*1.23*1.4764=19.99 trees per hour. At the rate of $.50 per tree, an average worker earned 19.99*0.5=$9.9969, precisely the competitive level. Yet, for the purpose of maximizing profit, the firm set the rate a bit too high: Thinning 1 tree would cost 1/11.01*8=$0.73, yielding profit of p * 1-0.73 per tree under hourly wage, whereas it cost 1*0.5=$0.5, yielding profit of p * 0.6773-0.5 per tree under the piece rate pay of $0.5 per tree for the field. If we think the firm earned zero economic profit per tree under hourly wage, i.e., p=.73, then the profit per tree was 0.73*0.6773-0.5=-0.006 per tree under this level of piece rate. Seen it another way, while the earnings for workers increased by 10/8-1=25%, their productivity on average only increased by 23% (from Table  3A) . Overall, though, the piece rate was set at a much more reasonable level than what was achieved at Ranch 1.
The above analysis shows the intricacy of setting the right level of piece rate: the contract designer needs information on an average worker's productivity under piece rate and an accurate estimate of the difficulty of the job on each field. Trees differ in their excess apples. The more variable the trees are, the more samples need to be collected (resources need to be devoted) to assess the true parameters of each field and set the right piece rate for that field.
Still, the measurement costs are low compared with the more than 20 percent increase in productivity that is attributed to the incentive effect of piece rate contracts. After these two experiments, YVO implemented piece rates in its thinning.
Results on Selection Effect of Piece Rate Contracts
The experiments were short and there was no worker turnover for me to examine the selection effect of a piece rate contract. We did, however, conduct a questionnaire in which workers were asked whether they prefer piece rates or hourly wages. We thus can examine the question of whether high ability workers prefer piece rate pay, providing indirect evidence that high ability workers would be attracted to piece rate firms and low ability workers to hourly wage firms.
We measure ability using the worker fixed effects estimated from Equation (2) for Ranch 1 and Equation (3) for Ranch 2. We then regress the preference variable on the estimated worker fixed effect. The preference variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the worker answered that he prefers piece rate, 0.5 if he is indifferent, and 0 if he prefers hourly wage. The mean of the preference variable is 0.62 for Ranch 1 and 0.80 for Ranch 2.
25 Table 5 provides the regression results of the below equation:
The result for Ranch 1 is in column 1 of Table 5 and that for Ranch 2 in column 2. The coefficient on ability is positive for Ranch 1, albeit not reaching statistical significance. The coefficient on ability is positive and statistically significant for Ranch 2. The magnitude of 1.93 suggests that for a standard deviation increase in ability, 0.14, the preference of piece rate increases by 1.93 * 0.14=27 percent. Probit analysis yields similar results. 1. Ability is measured using the worker fixed effects in column 4 of Table 3A. 2. Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Using Randomized Control and Treatment Groups in Conducting Field Experiments within Firms
As Levitt and List (2008) point out, using experiments to examine questions on firms is a promising field. Through our experience with two methods, one using randomized control and treatment groups and one applying treatment across the board, we attempt to examine more broadly the strengths and weakness of different methods of experimentation in firms.
In framed field experiments in firms (Harrison and List, 2004) , there are two ways to apply the treatment. The standard one is to use randomized control and treatment groups. The change in the treatment group's behavior is used to examine the impact of the treatment, while the change in the control group's behavior is used to control for effects of time-varying factors. This method yields a difference-in-difference estimator. While it has the advantage of controlling for changes over time, in field experiments within firms where some workers are treated while others are not, potential biases might arise. The first type of problems arises when the control group subjects know of the disparate treatment. The effects on the estimation are two-fold. One possible response from the workers is a feeling of resentment due to perceived unfair treatment. This causes disruption to their work and lowers productivity of the control group workers, leading to an upward bias for the estimate. The other possible response is that the untreated ones strive to impress the experimenter (usually the management, which implements the experiments designed by the researcher) so that they can get the treatment, which they think is a privilege not granted to them before. 26 The second kind of problems might exist even when control group subjects are not aware of the disparate treatment, and the impact on estimates can go either way. The control group subjects might observe the behavior of the treatment group subjects and are influenced by the latter, a positive peer effect or spillover effect, which causes a downward bias in the estimate. 27 On the other hand, the control group subjects, if able to observe co-workers' behavior, might free-ride. 28 One can think of this as negative spillover, causing an upward bias of the estimated coefficient.
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Variants of randomized experiments alleviate the above problems while possibly exacerbating others. One variant is to apply the treatment in one location and put the control group in another location. The strength of this method is of course that it avoids the various problems above; a potential weakness is that the locations need to be comparable for the purpose of evaluating the coefficient of interest. Along this line of method is to introduce the treatment over time across locations, as in Lazear (2000)'s study. The other variant is to take turns in treating the groups, i.e., in period 1, group A is treated (and group B is the control group), and in period 2, group B is treated (and group A serves as the control group.) 30 Compared with the standard randomized treatment method, its strength is that the sample is balanced; the researcher has more observations of treated subjects. In taking turns to treat the two groups, the positive and the negative spillover effects are likely to be greatly reduced. This method is a mixed blessing for the problem of control group subjects knowing of their disparate treatment. On the one hand, as discussed above, the researcher can more easily deflect the complaints by responding to the subjects that they will be treated in the coming period. On the other hand, knowing that they will be treated in later periods, the control group workers can be strategic in allocating their actions over time, causing bias to the estimate of the coefficient.
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The alternative to a randomized treatment is to treat the subjects all at once. The strength, of course, is that it is free of the above potential problems. The potentially weakness is that other things might change as well. One therefore 27 Falk and Ichino (2006) document the positive peer effect, and Bandiera et al. (2010) provide evidence of the impact of friendship on workers' productivity. 28 Mas and Moretti (2009) document that the free-riding happens in a setting where co-workers have to pick up slack from slow co-workers, and further show that peer monitoring disciplines the free-riding. 29 These sources of bias exhibit themselves in different forms in different settings. In program evaluations in social experiments, for example, control group subjects use alternative methods to improve their performance, which leads to substitution bias and underestimation of the true effect (see Levitt and List, 2008 for a discussion of this effect). 30 The feasibility of such a method varies according to the question examined. For example, if one examines the effect of having more education, the researcher can not undo the treatment of having more education. This method is used in Shearer (2004), Fehr and Goette (2007) , and Hossain and List (2009) , for example. 31 Another issue might also arise related to the un-treating of the group that was treated. A treated subject may form a new habit after his or her experience under the treatment, causing a bias to the estimate. needs to find ways to control for the time-varying factors that affect the dependent variable.
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In our experiment 1, we encountered the first kind of problems associated with randomized control and treatment groups. Around 8:30 a.m. of day 2, as the workers from two opposing ends of the block converged to the middle of the block, the fast workers in the control group who advanced to the center of the block learned that their fellow workers in the other half of the block were being paid piece rate. They expressed their concern and the management decided to say that the firm was running an experiment on job satisfaction and that they would all be paid piece rates the next day. 33 The possible bias could be that the fast workers in the control group were disrupted by the disparity and reduced their speed (disruption effect), which would cause over-estimation. However, it could also be that workers in the control group wanted to demonstrate that they were no less productive than those in the treatment group (demonstration effect), which would make our difference-in-difference estimator underestimate the true effect. The third possible bias is that the fast control group workers, once aware that they will be put under a different pay scheme after talking to the management, would strategically keep their effort low during hourly wage days so that on piece rate days, they can work hard and earn a good pay (strategic delaying effect).
We likely were affected by the second kind of biases as well. It could be that control group workers observed and were influenced by the speed of coworkers, who were treated with piece rate pay, and thus might have picked up their own speed, creating a positive spillover effect and downward bias of the estimate. It could also be that the fast workers in the control group might have observed that their peer group was moving fast when they approached the middle of the field, and might have responded by slowing down since they realized the field could be done ahead of time (negative spillover effect), causing an upward bias in the estimated coefficient.
Results in Figure 1A and Table 2 show that average productivity of control group workers increased by a bit over 10 percent. A closer look at the data reveals that the increase mainly came from a couple of fast workers in the control group. This evidence thus suggests that the demonstration effect -fast workers picked up speed to show that they deserved the piece rate pay -dominates the others (disruption, strategic delaying, positive spillover, and negative spillover effects.) 34 But we can't rule out the possibility that the change was due to greater proficiency for more able workers on the second day. We believe the impacts of the bias can be minimal, since it is only when workers in the two groups converged to the middle of the field that the possible bias started to play out. We thus estimate the coefficient using the difference-in-difference framework (Equation (2)).
The concern that subjects in the control group might complain and the block being very non-uniform were the main reasons that we applied the treatment across the board in the second experiment. In experiment 2, potential confounding issues included i) varied condition of the field across rows, ii) weather, and iii) increased proficiency with the task. We measured and controlled for the first in our regression analyses, showed the limited impact of the second, and used different specifications to examine the impact of the increased proficiency. In sum, there are broadly four ways to conduct field experiments within a firm.
35 Method 1 is to pick one location and apply the treatment at the subject level, i.e., randomize some subjects into the control group and others into the treatment group. Method 2 (variant 1 of method 1) is to apply the treatment at one location (and thus treat all subjects at that location) and use subjects at another location (or other locations) as the control group. Method 3 (variant 2 of method 1) is to pick one location, randomize subjects into two groups and treat the two groups in turn. Method 4 is to apply the treatment across the board. We list them in Table 6 . For example, for this specific issue of the impact of piece rate on productivity, our studies use method 1 and 4, Lazear (2000) uses 2, and Shearer (2004) uses 3. In Appendix D, we discuss some field experiment papers that utilize the four methods and examine how they deal with the issues raised above. The strengths and weaknesses of these methods for experiments within firms are summarized in Table A3 in the Appendix. One should therefore pick the methods that best suit the research question and the setting. These are some of the predictions. First, when applying treatment at one location (methods 1 and 3), researchers should try to prevent communication and observation between the two groups. Second, if we have enough locations and locations are comparable, randomize at the location level (method 2); otherwise randomize at the subject level. Third, if the researcher randomizes at the subject level and has plenty of periods to work with, then whether to treat groups in turn depends on its feasibility; whereas if one has few periods, it is better to use period 2 to continue treatment to address the Hawthorne Effect (method 1 versus 3). Last, if applying disparate treatment is infeasible, then apply the treatment across the board (method 4). One then needs to use historical or other sources of data to capture the possible over-time changes. One can also exploit other variations to get difference-in-difference estimators using theories as guidance.
Conclusion
Using two small field experiments that differ in design from previous work, this paper provides evidence of a 23 percent productivity increase attributable to the incentive effect of piece rate contracts. The quality did not decrease with the gain in speed. This experiment highlights the measurement costs involved in implementing piece rates: To set the right level of piece rate for a particular field, the principal needs to devote resources to assess the working conditions to estimate an average worker's productivity in the field.
Despite its weakness of small sample size, we think the experiment is a worthy experience as it provides another example of when piece rate contracts can be effective, i.e., when quality can be assured at relatively low cost and measurement cost is relatively low. Our two different experimentation methods also highlight the merits and weaknesses of the different methods of conducting within-firm field experiments.
did not record the apples on the ground for rows finished in the middle of day 4; what he counted were for the rows that the workers came to work on at the end of day 4 -even rows of rows 51-70. Similarly, we use a linear interpolation (the average of day 3 and end of day 4 thickness) to obtain an estimate of the thickness of trees finished during day 4. We treat the average tree thickness of odd rows in rows 11-30 (on day 2) as 1; the thickness of even rows in rows 11-30 (on day 3) and 51-70 (end of day 4) then was 0.9587 and 0.5155, respectively, and thus the thickness of even rows in rows 31-50 (during day 4) was (.9587+.5155)/2=0.7371.
C. Discussion of results for Ranch 2
For the block at Ranch 2, rows of trees thinned on day 1 and during day 4 were missing the measure of apples on the ground. In Appendix B, we use a linear interpolation method to estimate the missing measure. It is informative to see the sensitivity of the results to different specifications and assumptions of the thickness of trees in these rows. The specification is the same as that in row 3 of Table 3B . Row 2 assumes that the rows on day 1 were as thick as the rows thinned on day 2 (where they were 1.18 times the thickness on day 2 in the baseline result), and the coefficient of interest becomes 0.26. Results from similar exercises are shown in rows 3 and 4 where we assume that the thick rows are 1.1 and 1.2 times the thickness for rows thinned on day 2, respectively. The percentage changes turn into 26.11 and 22.21 percent, respectively. The estimate responds to the assumptions in a predictable way: The thicker the rows thinned on day 1, the lower the estimated productivity increase.
During day 1 when workers worked on the thick rows, workers finished the bottoms of trees and then walked back and worked on the tops of trees. Trees were on average 11 feet tall and a worker could on average reach 7.5 feet above ground without a ladder. Therefore when a tree's bottom was finished and the top unfinished, we calculate it as 7.5/11 = 0.68 of a tree finished. The fifth row provides the results when we assume that a bottom is equivalent to 6.5/11 = 0.59. The result is quite similar to the baseline result. Overall, the take-away from Table A2 is that the effect of a switch from hourly wages to piece rates is on the order of 23 percent.
On the third (natural) day of the experiment, workers were told that they would be paid by piece rate at the rate of $0.50 per tree once they embarked on the even (piece rate) rows. But first they had to finish the odd rows that they had not completed at the end of day 2 and be paid hourly wages for those rows before they could start the piece rate rows and be paid by piece rate. Therefore, workers started working under piece rate pay at different times of (natural) day 3. At 7:00 a.m. on (natural) day 3, it started to rain and the workers stopped working for the day. This first hour of natural day 3 and the hours of natural day 4 that workers took to finish the odd (hourly wage) rows can be thought of as day 2.5 of the experiment. In the base-line result, day 2.5 productivity was merged into day 3 productivity, which was regarded as productivity under piece rate. The justification for this is that during day 2.5, a worker's opportunity cost was the piece rate pay. A robustness check can separate the day 2.5 productivity (before workers started the piece rate rows) from day 3 productivity (after they started on piece rate rows). The third row from the bottom of Table A2 shows that the estimated productivity effect increases to 33.04 percent. This is an upper bound of the true productivity since the day 2.5 covers only the first one and a half hours of the natural day 3 when people probably have not worn out. When we add a control variable for day 2.5, the estimated productivity effect of piece rates becomes 19.78 percent (shown in the second row from the bottom.)
D. Discussion of papers using different experimentation methods in withinfirm field experiments
We hereby pick a couple of recent papers that use different experimentation methods in within-firm field experiments to discuss the possible biases associated with the various methods identified in Section 4.5 and how the authors deal with them. Cai et al. (2009) examine restaurant patrons' choice of dishes when treated with information on the most popular dishes. Fehr and Goette (2007) examine messengers' response to an increase in piece rate. List and Hossain (2009) examine workers' differential response to a reward for good performance versus a punishment for bad performance. Bandiera et al (2005) examine fruit pickers' response when the pay method is switched from relative performance evaluation to pure piece rate pay.
To examines the effect of observational learning on diners' choice of dishes, Cai et al. (2009) treat some customers with information on the 5 most popular dishes on a plaque, treat some with none, and treat some with a plague containing information on 5 randomly chosen dishes to capture a saliency effect. They apply the treatments at both the subject (which is the table) level and the shop level, using both method 1 and method 2. At five randomly chosen sites, they randomly assign some tables to the treatment of information on the 5 most popular dishes and other tables to no information. At four other sites, they randomly assign some tables to the treatment of information on randomly chosen 5 dishes on a plaque and other tables to no information. With respect to randomizing subjects within a site, the possible effects from knowing the disparate treatment and from observing fellow diners manifest themselves in different forms than in a production setting. First, people at untreated tables might take the plague in neighboring treated tables and read it. Second, people at untreated tables can observe their neighbors' choices of dishes and follow suit. Both potentially cause attenuation (downward) bias, but the magnitudes of these problems might be small. With respect to randomization at the shop level, the authors check whether the sites are comparable in different dimensions. Fehr and Goette (2007) randomize messengers into group A and group B and treat them in turn, using method 3. Messengers work on different routes, so they are unlikely to observe each other's productivity and hence the peer effect likely is minimal. They might talk to each other though, since the way messengers were assigned to the treatment and the control group was according to the time they joined the firm; hence it is likely that control group workers and treatment group workers might have formed friendships. If control group workers brought up the issue of disparate treatment, the field researcher can answer that they will be treated in the next period. One then might have the bias from the fact that control group workers save efforts on hourly wage days for use in future piece rate days. In Hossain and List (2009) , to minimize information transmission between control and treatment groups, the authors arrange them in separate rooms (if not floors). However, if workers stay in the same dormitory, they might communicate and thus know of the disparate treatment. Bandiera et al (2005) exploit a naturally occurring change of compensation method across the firm, using method 4. The researchers find ways to deal with the possible other changes over time. For example, they use a later year's data to check for possible seasonal effect (and find it unable to explain the results). They also include a time trend and control for the workers' experience and the field life cycle. Rows worked on at the end of day 4
Appendix for Tables
Workers finished the remaining even numbered rows 51 to 70 and the odd numbered rows 31 to 70 on an extra day. The number of trees thinned in the dependent variable is adjusted using the group average count of apples on the ground. Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The last column provides the percentage change of productivity from the estimated coefficient. No contamination effects.
-Use another year's data to find out seasonal effect.
-Use comparable entities (city, block, firm, etc.) to check for possible changes over the time.
-Find variables that capture changes over time.
-Use other variations to get difference-indifference estimators using theories as guidance.
